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NATO's Options for Defensive Cyber Against Non-State Actors
Estonians-leaving 800 arrested, 153 injured, and one dead. 3 Ethnic Russians throughout Eurasia took umbrage to the perceived insult to veterans and survivors of the "Great Patriotic War," which generated conspiratorial activity on the Russianlanguage Internet forums-urging followers to disable Estonia's Internet infrastructure. 4 The cyber event began with "Script-kiddies"-amateurish cyber activists who copy 2 programs from hacker websites-initiating demands on Estonian websites with simple "ping" attacks. 5 Two weeks later-just hours before "Victory Day" itself-Estonian government, banking, and business websites received a 200-fold increase in traffic from nearly a million unwittingly enslaved "botnet" computers worldwide. 6 A "bot" is a computer infected by malware that reprograms it to respond to an external serveroften in a different country. 7 It was through these botnets that demands for bandwidth increased exponentially-from 1,000 packets 8 per day on 26 April to 2,000 packets per hour on 27 April to 4 million packets per second on 9 May 2007. Hundreds of targeted websites crashed from an inability to handle the volume of packets directed to them. 9 Neither the European Union nor NATO could find evidence of direct collusion between the Russian government and the hackers who fomented the DDOS against Estonian governance and commerce, 10 but lost revenue and information technology expenses to
Estonian businesses amounted to an estimated 3 million euros. 11 Estonia lost over 21 The NATO network has about thirty "significant" cyber intrusions every day on its networks, routinely attempting to insert spyware into servers and individual computers. 22 There must be criteria established for a response to cyber events directed against NATO below the unambiguous armed attack levelacceptable under international norms and palatable to members of the alliance.
Under international law, a nation-state is responsible for any unlawful activity emanating from within its borders, provided that it has the capacity to exercise control over the whole of its territory-according to Nicholas Tsagourias, University of Glasgow, an international law and security scholar. 23 From the CCD-CoE's perspective, a member state that suffers a cyber-incident for which another state is responsible may "respond to that violation of international law by resorting to proportionate responses.
These may include, where appropriate in the circumstances, countermeasures (Rule 9) or the use of force in self-defence (Rule 13 Countermeasures against centrally controlled botnets may include forcibly redirecting bots to a different server-which instructs bots to uninstall themselves from infected computers. 28 The more sophisticated peer-to-peer bots, which seek other bots but have no central controller, can be infiltrated with fake bots that send code instructing other bots to shut down their own malware. 29 The key word in Hinkle's definition is state; the use of countermeasures is more complex with non-state actors. In the case of Estonia, the challenge of attribution presented difficulties in proving that Russia sponsored unlawful cyber activity, but certainly its refusal to stop the DDOS was unlawful. The cyber incident was well-publicized through international media; journalists repeatedly requested comments from Russian officials about the matter-yet the Putin government did nothing to stop it or even investigate the likely locations of the botnet controllers.
After days of intermittent DDOS activity, the Estonian General Prosecutor sent a letter to the Russian government-requesting investigation of several suspected cyber militia
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses in Russia. The response from his Russian counterpart was dismissive: "We do not co-operate because our criminal code does not recognize the procedure identification of IP addresses." 30 Ultimately Estonia identified IP addresses associated with botnets in 175 countries. After the incident ended on 19
May, the governments of every nation-except Russia-assisted Estonia in removing the malware that had enslaved unwitting computers. 31 Russia's failure to enforce the rule of law implies tacit permission for cyber militias to operate with impunity; evidence suggests that the untouchable status of Russian patriotic hackers is more by design than lack of law enforcement capacity or expertise.
There are a number of suspicious connections between the Russian government and one of Russia's largest youth groups, calling itself the Nashi ("ours")-a pro-Kremlin organization notorious for its association with illicit Internet activity. The Nashi were successor. 32 As a former director of the FSB, President Putin would have been well versed in its covert cyber capabilities, and Boykov's associations with organized crime.
RBN's connections with law enforcement through former FSB officers ensured the Russian government's security services never arrested any RBN members; therefore, they were emboldened to rent their "services to cyber criminals and hacker patriots." 33 The FSB had maintained an unsavory relationship with hackers since the early 1990s; In the case of Estonia's DDOS in 2007, government operations were virtually shut down for weeks and the populace certainly was intimidated; it is therefore not unreasonable to deem the event "cyber-terrorism" and swing Estonia's NATO allies into cyber action.
Internet anonymity will soon fade into the past; marketing firms are improving their attribution software models massively every year-to the point that advertising is reaching consumers that precisely addresses their respective product interests.
Presumably the military cyber professionals among the NATO signatories are developing the same capabilities, albeit in a significantly more advanced fashion. Since nation-states are unlikely to leave their digital fingerprints on malware, the attribution focus comes down to identifying individual IP addresses-frequently disguised through multi-stage attacks that route through a series of unwitting computers, often in different countries. 40 Clever hackers purposely route their Internet traffic through IP addresses with kinetic attacks by Russia-unsurprisingly using some botnet controller computers associated with the Russian Business Network. 58 The STUXNET cyber weapon France, and Great Britain. 72 A senior German official purportedly opined-following the DDOS event in Estonia-that NATO's Article 5 agreement should extend to the cyber domain. 73 The trouble with anticipatory self-defense against non-state actors is in determining intent; some intrusive malware is placed to cause damage-but it is far more common to encounter malware intended for persistent espionage.
International law does not address spying-largely because every country does it and none wants to cease collecting intelligence. Col Gary Brown and Maj Keira Poellet assert in "The Customary International Law of Cyberspace" that since "cyber activities are frequently akin to espionage…most cyber activities can also occur without violating territorial sovereignty." 74 Applying the "espionage template" to this international legal question suggests that because states recognize spying occurs routinely, they simply cannot do anything about malicious cyber events; the two are presumably too difficult to Cyber has joined air, land, sea, and space as a fifth operational domain of modern warfare. 79 Since there has not been a thorough overhaul of international law since the highly kinetic 1940s, its application to cyber operations is clumsy and inconsistent. In summary, there are three scenarios in which cyber countermeasures would be appropriate: (1) when a nation-state fails to enforce the rule of law against 
